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Abstract
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approxima-
tion guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited
supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on
a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue
that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices
that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the
second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously
near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments.
1 Introduction
The goal in prior-free auction design is to design auctions that have ro-
bust, input-by-input performance guarantees. Traditionally, auctions are
evaluated using average-case or Bayesian analysis, and expected auction
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performance is optimized with respect to a prior distribution over inputs
(i.e., bid vectors). The Bayesian versions of the problems we consider are
completely solved [19]. Worst-case guarantees are desirable when, for exam-
ple, good prior information is expensive or impossible to acquire, and when
a single auction is to be re-used several times, in settings with different or
not-yet-known input distributions.
Prior-free auctions were first studied by Goldberg et al. [9, 10]. They
focused on symmetric settings, where goods and bidders are identical, and
sought auctions with expected revenue close to the fixed-price benchmark F (2),
defined as the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a given bid vec-
tor by offering every bidder a common posted price (i.e., take-it-or-leave-it
offer) that is at most the second-highest bid. Goldberg et al. [9] showed
that no auction has expected revenue more than a ≈ .42 fraction of F (2) for
every bid vector, and constructed auctions with expected revenue at least
a constant fraction of this benchmark on every input. See Hartline and
Karlin [12] for a survey of further work in this vein.
Hartline and Roughgarden [13] proposed a framework for defining mean-
ingful performance benchmarks much more generally — when bidders or fea-
sibility constraints are asymmetric, and for objective functions other than
revenue. The first step of this framework is a “Bayesian thought experiment”
— if bidders’ valuations were drawn from a prior distribution in some class,
what would the optimal auction be? The second step is to characterize
the collection C of all optimal auctions that can arise, ranging over all per-
missible prior distributions. Finally, given a bid vector b, the performance
benchmark is defined as the maximum objective function value obtained
by an auction in C on the input b. This framework regenerates the F (2)
benchmark (modulo the technically necessary upper bound on prices) and
has been used for several other objective functions and asymmetric environ-
ments [5, 13, 14, 15, 17]. Every benchmark generated by this framework
is automatically well motivated in the following sense: if the performance
of an auction is within a constant factor of such a benchmark for every in-
put, then in particular it is simultaneously near-optimal in every Bayesian
environment with valuations drawn from one of the permissible prior distri-
butions.1
Leonardi and Roughgarden [17] studied the design and analysis of prior-
free digital goods (i.e., unlimited supply) auctions with asymmetric bid-
1This weaker goal of good prior-independent auctions can also be studied in its own
right [6, 7, 21]. See [3, 4, 18] for other interpolations between average-case and worst-case
analysis of auctions.
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ders. They pointed out that the framework in [13] can be applied success-
fully to non-identical bidders only if sufficient qualitative information about
bidder asymmetry is publicly known. They proposed a model of ordered
bidders. Earlier bidders are in some sense expected to have higher valua-
tions. This information could be derived from, for example, zip codes, eBay
bidding histories, credit history, previous transactions with the seller, and
so on. Leonardi and Roughgarden [17] defined the monotone price bench-
markM(2)(b) for every bid vector b as the maximum revenue obtainable via
a monotone price vector — meaning prices are nonincreasing in the bidder
ordering — in which every price is at most the second-highest bid.2 The
value of this benchmark is always at least that of the fixed-price bench-
mark F (2), and can be a factor of Θ(log n) larger, where n is the number of
bidders. Essentially by construction, a digital goods auction that always has
revenue at least a constant fraction of M(2) is simultaneously near-optimal
in every Bayesian environment with ordered distributions (where monopoly
prices are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering), or when the valuation dis-
tribution of each bidder stochastically dominates that of the next one in
the ordering (see [17] for details). Examples include uniform distributions
with intervals [0, hi] and nonincreasing hi’s; exponential distributions with
nondecreasing rates; Gaussian distributions with nonincreasing means; and
so on. The main result in [17] is a prior-free digital goods auction with or-
dered bidders with expected revenue Ω(M(2)(b)/ log∗ n) for every input b,
where n is the number of bidders and log∗ n denotes the number of times
that the log2 operator can be applied to n before the result drops below a
fixed constant.3
1.1 Our Results
We give the first digital goods auction that is O(1)-competitive with the
monotone price benchmark M(2). Our auction is simple and natural. It
follows the standard approach of randomly partitioning the bidders into two
groups, using one group of bidders to set prices for the other. We restrict
prices to be (essentially) all powers of a certain constant, but otherwise our
prices are simply the optimal monotone ones for the first bidder group. Fi-
nally, to handle inputs where the monotone price benchmark derives most
2This benchmark was also considered earlier, with a different motivation and applica-
tion, by Aggarwal and Hartline [1].
3Aggarwal and Hartline [1] previously obtained an incomparable guarantee of
Ω(M(2)(b)) − O(h log log log h), where h is the ratio between the maximum and mini-
mum bids.
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of its revenue from a small number of bidders, with constant probability
we invoke an auction that is O(1)-competitive with the fixed-price bench-
mark F (2).
We extend our results to multi-unit auctions, where the number of
items k can be less than the number of bidders. We consider the ana-
log M(2,k) of the monotone price benchmark, which maximizes only over
(monotone) price vectors that sell at most k units. We prove that every
auction that is O(1)-competitive with the benchmark M(2,k) implies simul-
taneously near-optimal for a range of Bayesian multi-unit environments —
roughly, those in which the (ironed) virtual valuation functions of the bidders
form a pointwise total ordering. We also give a general reduction, showing
how to build a limited-supply auction that is O(1)-competitive w.r.t.M(2,k)
from an unlimited-supply auction that is O(1)-competitive w.r.t. M(2).
2 Preliminaries
In a multi-unit auction, there is one seller, n bidders, and k identical items.
Each bidder wants only one good, and has a private — i.e., unknown to the
seller — valuation vi. We call the special case where k = n unlimited supply
or digital goods. We study direct-revelation auctions, in which the bidders
report bids b to the seller, and the seller then decides who wins a good
and at what price.4 For a fixed (randomized) auction, we use Xi(b) and
Pi(b) to denote the winning probability and expected payment of bidder i
when the bid profile is b. As in previous works on prior-free auction design,
we consider only auctions that are individually rational — meaning Pi(b) ≤
vi·Xi(b) for every i and b — and truthful, meaning that for each bidder i and
fixed bids b−i by the other bidders, bidder i maximizes its quasi-linear utility
vi ·Xi(bi,b−i)−Pi(bi,b−i) by setting bi = vi. Since we consider only truthful
auctions, from now on we use bids b and valuations v interchangeably.
Truthful and individually rational digital goods auctions have a nice
canonical form: for every bidder i there is a (possibly randomized) func-
tion ti(v−i) that, given the valuations v−i of the other bidders, gives bidder i
a “take-it-or-leave-it offer” at the price ti(v−i). This means that bidder i
is given a good if and only if vi ≥ ti(v−i), in which case it is charged the
price ti(v−i). It is clear that every choice (t1, . . . , tn) of such functions de-
fines a truthful, individually rational digital goods auction; conversely, every
such auction is equivalent to a choice of (t1, . . . , tn) [9]. A special case of
4For the questions we ask, the “Revelation Principle” (see, e.g., Nisan [20]) ensures
that there is no loss of generality by considering only direct-revelation auctions.
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such an auction is a price vector p, in which each ti is the constant func-
tion ti(v−i) = pi. When the supply is limited (i.e., there are k < n copies of
the good), truthful auctions induce functions (t1, . . . , tn) with the property
that, on every input, at most k bidders win.
The revenue of an auction on the valuation profile v is the sum of the
payments collected from the winners. Let v(2) denote the second-highest
valuation of a profile v. The fixed-price benchmark F (2) is defined, for each
valuation profile v, as the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a
constant price vector whose price is at most v(2):
F (2)(v) = max
p≤v(2)
 ∑
i : vi≥p
p
 .
Now suppose there is a known ordering on the bidders, say 1, 2, . . . , n. The
monotone-price benchmarkM(2) is defined analogously to F (2), except that
non-constant monotone price vectors are also permitted:
M(2)(v) = max
v(2)≥p1≥p2≥···≥pn
 ∑
i : vi≥pi
pi
 . (1)
Clearly, M(2)(v) ≥ F (2)(v) for every input v.
The monotonicity and upper-bound constraints are enforced only in the
computation of the benchmark M(2). Auctions, while obviously not privy
to the private valuations, can employ whatever prices they see fit. This is
natural for prior-free auctions and also necessary for non-trivial results [8].
Finally, when we say that an auction is α-competitive with or has ap-
proximation factor α for a benchmark, we mean that the auction’s expected
revenue is at least a 1/α fraction of the benchmark for every input v.
3 Optimal price scaling
In this section, we propose and analyze a simple auction, which we call
Optimal Price Scaling (OPS). The basic idea is very natural: partition
the sequence of bidders into two random sets, find the optimal M(2) price
vector p for one part A (the training part) and offer p to the other part
B (the test part). We add two twists to this standard algorithmic scheme.
First, we restrict the prices to be on discrete levels, so that at every level
the prices remain the same, while the price drops from level to level by a
constant factor w, where w is a parameter of the algorithm (a particular
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value that works is w = 25)5. The levels of the prices start at the second
maximum value vA
(2)
of the training part A. The second twist is that we run
the algorithm with the dropping prices only with some constant probability
and, with the remaining probability, we run a standard digital goods auction
with constant competitive ratio. The precise description of the auction is
given in Figure 1.
Input: A valuation profile v for a totally ordered set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of
bidders.
1. With probability 1/2, run a digital goods auction on v that is O(1)-
competitive with respect to the benchmark F (2). With the remaining
probability, run the following steps.
2. Choose a subset A ⊆ N uniformly at random, and partition N into
the two sets A and B. Let vA denote the valuation profile v in which
we set the values not in A to 0, that is,
vAj =
{
vj if j ∈ A
0 otherwise.
Define vB in a similar way. All three sequences v, vA, and vB have
the same length.
3. Compute an optimal monotone M(2) price vector p for A with prices
restricted to discrete values in {vA(2)/wk : k = 0, . . .}.
4. Sell items to bidders in B only, applying prices p to vB.
Figure 1: The auction Optimal Price Scaling (OPS).
We next elaborate on the steps of the auction. In the first step, we
run an arbitrary digital goods auction that is O(1)-competitive with respect
to the fixed-price benchmark F (2). The best-known approximation factor
is 3.12 [16]; there are also very simple auctions with approximation fac-
tors 4 [9] and 4.68 [2]. Intuitively, this step is meant to extract good revenue
from the set of bidders with valuations almost as high as the second-highest
5From our analysis of this algorithm, it follows if we, instead of fixing the prices at
discrete levels, offered to the trial part the optimal price of the training part reduced by
a factor w, we will still get a truthful algorithm with constant approximation ratio.
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valuation.
The second step of the algorithm randomly partitions the bidders into
a “training set” A and a “test set” B. Almost all prior-free auctions have
this structure, with the bidders in the training set setting prices for those
in the test set. We want to keep the three sequences vA, and vB aligned
to simplify the pricing of the next two steps. To do this, we keep all the
elements of v in vA and vB, but in vA we lower the elements that are not
in A to 0, and similarly, we lower the elements of sequence vB that are not
in B to 0.
Also for simplicity, we sell (in the fourth step) only to bidders in the
test set B. An obvious optimization is to sell simultaneously to bidders
in A, using the bids of B; this would improve the hidden constant in our
approximation guarantee by a factor of 2.
The optimal monotone price vector is the one that maximizes the M(2)
revenue obtained from the bidders in A when prices are scaled down to the
next level v
A(2)
wk
. The scaling down of the prices won’t reduce the optimal
revenue on the A set of bidders for more than a factor of w. The final step
applies the prices to bidders in the test set B.
The OPS auction is truthful, as each bidder faces a take-it-or-leave-it
offer at a price that is independent of its reported valuation. We also note
that the OPS auction can be implemented in polynomial time, as p can be
computed efficiently using dynamic programming.
Our main result is a prior-free approximation guarantee for the OPS
auction.
Theorem 3.1 There is a constant c0 > 0 such that, for every valuation
profile v, the expected revenue of the OPS auction is at least c0 · M(2)(v).
We outline the main ideas of the proof of the theorem here and we present
the details below. Let us first make a useful assumption
Definition 3.2 (First running assumption) In the analysis of the algo-
rithm, we will assume that the two bidders of v with the highest valuation
fall into A. Therefore
v(2) = vA
(2)
.
This assumption holds with probability 1/4, which will essentially in-
crease the competitive ratio of the analysis below by a factor of 4. We remove
this assumption, when we put all the pieces of the analysis together.
Let us now fix some notation:
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Definition 3.3 Define the k-th price level p(k) to be
p(k) = v
(2)/wk.
Let also Jk denote the interval in which the prices of the auction are at the
k-th level:
Jk = {j : pj = p(k)}.
The intervals J0, . . . , Jm are defined in the third step of the algorithm from
vA. If there are many optimal solutions in the third step, we fix one and we
use it in the final step of the algorithm.
The intuition for the algorithm is that the optimal revenue for the whole
sequence v is up to a constant factor equal to the expected optimal rev-
enue from the subsequence vA. We then need only to compare the optimal
expected revenues from the subsequences vA and vB. If there were many
values in a pricing level Jk, then the random partition is expected to split
almost evenly the high-valued bids between the training set A and the test
set B and this will allow us to relate their revenue. One problem with this
approach is that some levels may have few items; another more subtle prob-
lem is that even when a level has many items, we cannot easily argue that
the two parts have almost the same number of high values, because there is
a bias towards A by the way the levels were created.
To resolve both these issues and in order to compare the revenue of A
and B, we use as an intermediary a set of some fixed intervals, defined with
respect to the set v of all values (in contrast to the way that the levels are
created by the pricing of A). The set of fixed intervals, which we will call
primal intervals, consists of one collection of intervals for each pricing level.
We want them to have two crucial properties: first, every primal interval
to have almost the same fraction (and in particular a fraction in [1/3, 2/3])
in A and B of the bids higher than the pricing level; and second, that the
revenue of A is captured up to a constant factor by a set of primal intervals.
3.1 Primal intervals
We now define the set of primal intervals. They will be defined in terms of
v, the whole sequence of values. We will need some definitions first:
Definition 3.4
• Define N` to be the set of values greater or equal to the `-th price level.
N` = {j : vj ≥ p(`)} (2)
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• Define µ`(I), the mass of an interval I at price level `, to be the number
of its values that are in N` (at price level ` or higher).
µ`(I) = |I ∩N`|.
For each price level `, we create a set of intervals I` which we will call
primal intervals at price level `. When we refer to the mass of a primal
interval I ∈ I`, we will mean µ`(I), its mass at its price level. We will
denote by start(I) and end(I) the beginning and end of an interval.
The primal intervals are defined with respect to 3 parameters: the pa-
rameter w which defines the price levels in the algorithm, a parameter
 ∈ (0, 1), which will be fixed later (a value of  = 1/25 will work for
the proof) and a parameter s0; notice that the parameters  and s0 are used
only in the analysis and they are not part of the algorithm.
We begin the construction with a fixed interval Io ∈ I0 which starts
at the first value and has µ0(Io) = s0, and we define the other intervals
recursively. If I ∈ I` is an interval that has already been defined, then we
add the following 5 intervals every one of which has mass (1 + ) · µ`(I);
if there is not enough mass to create some of these 5 intervals, we still
create them with the maximum possible mass to facilitate the recursive
construction, we call them incomplete, and we throw them away at the end
of the construction.
1. An interval at level I` which starts at start(I).
2. An interval at level I` which starts at end(I).
3. An interval at level I`+1 which starts at start(I).
4. An interval at level I`+1 which starts at end(I).
5. An interval at level I` which ends at end(I).
Figure 2 illustrates the construction. The reason for keeping around incom-
plete intervals is to allow an interval at level ` to be able to create intervals
at all higher levels. Specifically, we want an interval I ∈ I` to create every
possible interval at level ` + r, r ≥ 1, that start at the end (or beginning)
of I and have mass (1 + )r times the mass of I. For instance, even if the
interval at level `+ r is incomplete, we keep it in the recursive construction
to produce the potentially complete intervals at level ` + r + 1 by using
Rules 3 and 4. We extend the idea of keeping around incomplete intervals
to the original interval Io: if there are not enough elements with high mass,
9
I
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
II
I
(5)
I
Figure 2: The 5 intervals created from interval I. Rules 1, 2 and 5 create
intervals at the same level with I, while Rules 3 and 4 create intervals at
the next level. The drawing indicates the mass of the intervals—equal to
(1 + ) the mass of I—not their actual length.
we define Io to include the whole sequence, we call it incomplete, we use it
to create recursively the other intervals, and we throw it away at the end.
The mass of an incomplete interval in the construction is assumed to be
the originally intended mass. For example, suppose that a complete interval
I ∈ I` creates an incomplete interval I ′ which in turn creates a complete
interval I ′′; the mass of I ′′ is (1 + )2 times the mass of I, irrespectively of
the actual mass of I ′.
We now show a crucial property of the primal intervals: with probability
almost 1, every primal interval contains almost equal number of elements in
A and B. More precisely, let us call a primal interval I ∈ I` balanced, if at
least a third of the elements in I ∩N` belong to A and at least another third
belongs to B. For every , by selecting the parameter s0 appropriately,
we can make the probability of having some unbalanced primal interval
arbitrarily small. Before we state and prove a useful fact:
Lemma 3.5 If d is a positive constant such that d·s0 ≤ 1/10, then∑
`
∑
I∈I`
dµ`(I) ≤ 2 · ds0 .
Proof: Suppose that the initial interval in the construction has mass s ≥ s0
and define
f(s) =
∑
`
∑
I∈I`
dµ`(I),
to be the maximum value attained from the intervals produced from s by any
sequence of values. Essentially, we want to bound f(s0). By the recursive
construction of the intervals, we get that
f(s) ≤ cs + 5f((1 + ) · s).
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The lemma now follows from showing f(s) ≤ 2ds by backwards induction.
For s > n, this is vacuously true since there are no intervals. Suppose then
that f((1 + )s) ≤ 2d(1+)s, and we bound
f(s) ≤ ds + 5f((1 + )s) ≤ ds + 10d(1+)s
= ds + 10dsd·s ≤ ds + 10dsds0 ≤ ds + 10 1
10
ds = 2ds.

Lemma 3.6 There is a large enough constant s0, such that for every v and
, with probability at least 31/32 every primal interval is balanced.
Proof: The probability that a primal interval I is not balanced is at most
dµ`(I) for some constant d (Chernoff bound). Therefore, the probability that
some interval is not balanced is at most∑
`
∑
I∈I`
dµ`(I) ≤ 2ds0 ,
which drops exponentially in s0. By selecting s0 large enough, we can make
this probability as small as desired. 
3.2 Matching intervals
To gain some intuition of the use of the primal intervals, let us assume that
we could associate with every interval Jk a primal interval Ik ∈ Ik which
is also a subset of Jk. Let us further assume that among the possible Ik’s,
we always select the interval with maximum length. There are two facts
that allow us to relate the revenues from B and from A: the first is that by
the construction of the primal intervals, the length of Ik contains at least
1/(1 + 2) of Jk; the second is that the interval Ik is balanced. The latter
shows that the revenue from B in Ik is a constant fraction of the revenue
from N in Ik, which in turn is a constant fraction from the revenue from A
in Jk. The problem is that there may be intervals Jk that contain no primal
interval in Ik. To deal with this problem, we use a charging argument which
shows that the revenue lost from such intervals is not significant.
To turn this idea into a concrete proof, we give a process that attempts
to match every interval Jk to some primal interval in Ik; if the process
succeeds, we will call Jk matched and we will denote its matching primal
interval by Ik; if the process does not succeed for some interval Jk we will
call Jk unmatched. We first match every interval Jk that contains some
primal interval at the same price level.
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Definition 3.7 An interval Jk is called nice, if there is an primal interval
in I ∈ Ik such that start(Jk) ≤ start(I) ≤ end(I) ≤ end(Jk). We match Jk
with the maximum such interval I and we call it Ik.
We process the remaining intervals from left to right. To bootstrap the
process, we make the assumption that the first interval J0 is nice; we will
revisit and remove this assumption at the end of the proof.
Definition 3.8 (Second running assumption) Interval J0 is nice, i.e.,
it contains a primal interval of I0.
Starting with each nice interval, we process its following intervals from
left to right. We attempt to find a matching interval by creating a sequence
of candidate intervals. The definition of the sequence of candidate matching
intervals will be also useful later in the presentation of the main argument.
Figure 3 illustrates the process which is defined in detail below:
Definition 3.9 (Matching) For every interval Jt, we associate a non-
empty sequence of candidate matching intervals, all of which are at price
level t. If Jt is a nice interval, the sequence contains only the matching
interval It. For every other interval Jt, the sequence of candidate matching
intervals is created as follows:
The first candidate matching interval will be called I ′t plays also a central
role in the proof and it is based on the candidate matching intervals of the
previous interval Jt−1. In particular, if the previous interval is matched, then
I ′t is the interval produced from It−1 by Rule 4. Otherwise, if the previous
interval is unmatched, I ′t is the interval produced from I ′t−1 by Rule 3.
If end(I ′t) > end(Jt), the sequence of candidate matching intervals con-
tains only I ′t and we leave Jt unmatched.
Otherwise, the sequence of candidate matching intervals is produced from
this first interval I ′t by repeated applications of Rule 1, as long as the produced
intervals do not extend beyond Jt (i.e., they end at or before end(Jt)).
We match Jt with the maximum interval in the candidate matching se-
quence, which we name It.
3.3 Main argument
The set of nice intervals play central role in relating the revenue of A and
B. Before we proceed with the central argument, we give some essential
definitions and prove some useful facts about the matched intervals.
12
Jr
Jr+2
Jr+3
Jr+4
Jr+1
Ir
I'r+1
I'r+2
Ir+4
Ir+3
I'r+3 I''r+3
Figure 3: An example of the matching process. Interval Jr is nice. Interval
I ′r+1 is created from Ir by Rule 4. It extends beyond Jr+1, so we leave
Jr+1 unmatched. Interval I
′
r+2 is created from I
′
r+1 by Rule 3. Similarly,
we leave Jr+2 unmatched. Interval I
′
r+3 is created from I
′
r+2 by Rule 3; it
produces the sequence of candidate intervals I ′r+3, I ′′r+3, · · · , Ir+3 by repeated
applications of Rule 1. Interval Jr+3 is matched to Ir+3. Intervals Jr+4 and
Ir+4 exhibit a case in which the matched intervals do not have to intersect.
Definition 3.10 Let R(p, v) denote the total revenue extracted from the
sequence of values v with prices p. Let Rk(J, v) denote the revenue that can
be extracted from an interval J of v to which we offer the k-level price p(k):
Rk(J, v) = p(k) ·
∣∣{i : i ∈ J ∧ vi ≥ p(k)}∣∣. In particular, Rk(J,v) is equal to
the mass of J multiplied by p(k).
Lemma 3.11 The matching algorithm has the following properties:
1. If Jt is nice, then µt(Jt) ≤ (1 + 2)µt(It).
2. For every constant c3 > 2 let
c4 =
c3
c3 − 2 · (2 + ) · .
If Jt is not nice, then at least one of the following holds
µt(Jt) ≤ c3 · µt(I ′t) (3)
µt(Jt) ≤ c4 · µt(It) (4)
Proof: The properties follow directly from the definitions and the process.
For example, the first property, follows by the maximality of It taking into
account Rules 1 and 5; this is the only place in the proof where we use Rule
5.
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Jt
K0
I't
K1 Kr Kr+1{It
Figure 4: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.11.
The second property is more involved and uses the fact that Jt is not
nice. Notice first that if Jt is not matched, then µt(Jt) ≤ µt(I ′t) ≤ c3µt(I ′t)
and the property holds. So now assume that Jt is matched and consider
the sequence of intervals K0,K1, . . . ,Kr+1, produced when we start with
K0 = I
′
t and repeatedly apply Rule 2; the sequence ends when the produced
interval extends beyond Jt; that is, start(Kr+1) < end(Jt) < end(Kr+1)
(See Figure 4).
Since Jt is not nice, it does not include any of these intervals and in
particular interval Kr, so we must have that µt(Jt) ≤ µt(Kr) + µt(Kr+1).
This bounds the mass of Jt by
µt(Jt) ≤
(
(1 + )r + (1 + )r+1
)
µt(I
′
t) = (2 + )(1 + )
rµt(I
′
t).
On the other hand, It must contain almost all the mass of intervals
K0, . . . ,Kr. In particular, by the maximality of It, if we apply Rule 1 to It,
we get an interval which extends beyond Jt, and it certainly contains the
intervals K0, . . . ,Kr. Thus the mass of It is at least
µt(It) ≥ (µt(K0) + · · ·+ µt(Kr)) /(1 + )
= (1 + (1 + ) + · · ·+ (1 + )r) /(1 + ) · µt(I ′t)
=
(
(1 + )r+1 − 1) / ((1 + )) · µt(I ′t).
The lemma now follows from the above two bounds. Specifically, if
µt(Jt) > c3µt(I
′
t), then c3 ≥ (2 + )(1 + )r. We can then bound
µt(Jt) ≤ (2 + )(1 + )rµt(I ′t)
≤ (2 + )(1 + )r (1 + )
(1 + )r+1 − 1µt(It)
≤ c3
c3 − 2 · (2 + ) ·  · µt(It).

The essential part of proving the constant approximation ratio is a charg-
ing argument. The idea is to charge each of the values Rt(Jt,v) to some
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value Rs(Is,v) of some nice interval Js. To do this, we process the intervals
from left to right in phases. A phase begins with a nice interval and ends
exactly before the next nice interval (or at the last interval).
Lemma 3.12 (Phase) Let s, . . . s′ − 1 be a phase, that is, Js is a nice
interval and none of the intervals Jr for r = s+ 1, . . . , s
′ − 1 is nice. Then
there is a contant c such that
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(Jt,v) ≤ c ·Rs(Is,v) (5)
Proof: We charge each interval Jt, t = s + 1, . . . , s
′ − 1 to some primal
interval, according to the cases of the previous lemma, as follows:
1. If µt(Jt) ≤ c3 · µt(I ′t), we charge it to the previous matched interval.
Specifically, if σ(t) denotes the previous matched interval (for example,
in Figure 3, σ(r + 2) = r), then
Rt(Jt,v) ≤ c3Rt(I ′t,v) ≤ c3
(
1 + 
w
)t−σ(t)
Rσ(t)(Iσ(t),v).
2. Otherwise we charge Jt to It. Specifically, by Lemma 3.11 we have
Rt(Jt,v) ≤ c4Rt(It,v).
If we sum the above for t = s+ 1, . . . , s′ − 1, we get
s′−1∑
t=s+1
Rt(Jt,v) ≤
s′−1∑
t=s
αt ·Rt(It,v), (6)
for some αt which is the sum of all the above charges. The crucial property
of the parameters is that the total charge to every interval is low (less than
1/3) in every posible scenario. Specifically, the total charge to αt can be at
most c4 (Case 2), plus at most c3 ·
∑∞
i=1
(
1+
w
)i
= c3 · 1+w−1− from Case 1.
The total charge is
αt ≤ α = c4 + c3 · 1 + 
w − 1−  , (7)
which is less than 1/3 if we select the parameters appropriately.
We now use the optimality of price vector p to bound
∑s′−1
t=s Rt(Jt,v).
Consider decreasing the prices in the interval ∪s′−1t=s Jt to level s′− 1. By the
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optimality of the price profile p, this cannot give better revenue for vA, and
therefore
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(It,v
A) ≤
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(Jt,v
A). (8)
We want now to combine (6) and (8), but one involves v and the other vA,
so we employ the balance property to transform (8) to:
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(It,v) ≤ 3
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(It,v
A) ≤ 3
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(Jt,v
A) ≤ 3
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(Jt,v). (9)
We will also need the first property of Lemma 3.11:
Rs(Js,v) ≤ (1 + 2)Rs(Is,v). (10)
If we now combine Equations (6), (9), and (10) (multiply (9) by α, take
their sum, and divide the result by 1− 3α), we get
s′−1∑
t=s
Rt(Jt,v) ≤ 1 + 2
1− 3αRs(Js,v)
(this is were it is crucial that α is less than 1/3). Letting now c = 1+21−3α , we
get the lemma. 
By simply summing the inequalities of the previous lemma for all nice
intervals, we get:
Lemma 3.13 Let Jq0 , . . . , Jqm′ be the nice intervals. Assuming that the first
interval is matched (Definition 3.8), or equivalently that q0 = 0, there is a
constant c such that
m∑
j=0
Rj(Jj ,v) ≤ c ·
m′∑
k=0
Rqk(Iqk ,v). (11)
The previous lemma relates the revenue from the whole sequence to the
revenue from the matching primal intervals of nice intervals. Because on
every primal balanced interval the revenues of v, vA, and vB are all within
a constant factor, we can immediately relate R(p,vA) to R(p,vB).
Lemma 3.14 With the assumptions of the previous lemma,
R(p,vA) ≤ 3c ·R(p,vB).
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Jr
Jr+2
Jr+3
Jr+4
Jr+1
Ir
Ir+1
I'r+2
Ir+2
Ir+4
Figure 5: An example of possible charging. Jr is a nice interval. Jr+1 is
charged either to Ir (if the mass of I
′
r+1 is small) or to Ir+1 (otherwise).
Similarly Jr+2 is charged either to Ir+1 or to Ir+2 depending on the mass of
I ′r+2 (shown). Jr+3 is charged to Ir+2 (because it is not matched). Jr+4 is
charged either to Ir+2 or to Ir+4, depending on the mass of I
′
r+4.
Proof: We have the following derivations
R(p,vA) =
m∑
j=0
Rj(Jj ,v
A)
≤
m∑
j=0
Rj(Jj ,v)
≤ c ·
m′∑
k=0
Rqk(Iqk ,v)
≤ 3c ·
m′∑
k=0
Rqk(Iqk ,v
B)
≤ 3c ·
m′∑
k=0
Rqk(Jqk ,v
B)
≤ 3c ·
m∑
j=0
Rj(Jj ,v
B)
≤ 3c ·R(p,vB)
The first inequality is trivial because vA has smaller values than v, the
second inequality comes from the main lemma (Lemma 3.13), the third
inequality comes from the balance condition, the fourth inequality is based
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on the fact that Iqk is contained in Jqk . 
3.4 Stitching everything together
In this subsection, we revisit and remove the First Running Assumption.
For simplicity, we keep the Second Running Assumption and we deal with
it later.
Lemma 3.15 For every valuation profile v,
Pr
[
R(p,vA) ≥ 1
3w
· M(2)(v)
]
≥ 116 .
Proof: Let p∗ be the optimal prices for M(2)(v). With probability 1/4,
the bidders with the highest and second-highest valuations lie in A, i.e.,
v(2) = vA
(2)
. Given this event, the conditional expected revenue from
bidders in A and B under the price vector p∗ is at least M(2)(v)/2 and
at most M(2)(v)/2, respectively. By Markov’s inequality, the conditional
expected revenue from bidders in A under p∗ is at least 13M(2)(v) with
probability at least 14 .
The optimal revenue R(p,vA) from A cannot be worse than the revenue
from the pricing vector p∗ scaled down to the next power v
(2)
wk
. Since with
this scaling down, we loose at most a factor of w in the revenue, we conclude
that with probability at least 116 , R(p,v
A) ≥M(2)(v)/3w. 
If we choose appropriately the constant s0, Lemma 3.6 ensures that for
every constant  ∈ (0, 1], and every valuation profile v, every primal interval
is balanced with probability at least 31/32. (Note that for small n, this is
vacuously true since there are no primal intervals).
The probability that all positive events (that the two higher values are in
A, thatM(2)(vA) ≥ 13w ·M(2)(v), and that all primal intervals are balanced)
hold is at least 1 − ( 132 + 1516) = 132 . So, in the analysis of the performance
of the Optimal Price Scaling (OPS) auction, we can assume that these
events hold, which will increase the approximation ratio by a factor of 32.
By Lemma 3.14, we have that there are parameters , w and s0 such
that
R(p,vB) ≥ 1
3c
R(p,vA) ≥ 1
3c
1
3w
M(2)(v) = c1 · M(2)(v),
(where c1 = 1/(9cw)), which establishes the theorem under the assumption
that the first interval J0 is nice.
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3.5 Padding
In the previous subsection, we analyzed the algorithm and bounded its rev-
enue under the assumption that the first interval J0 is nice, i.e., it contains
a primal interval. We now show how to remove this assumption by padding
v on the left with a sequence of v(2) values which will guarantee that the
assumption holds. Then it suffices to show that the padding does not affect
the revenue significantly.
In particular, let vˆ be the sequence consisting of s′0 = 10s0 values v(2)
followed by v. With probability very close to 1, at least s0 of these values
go to vˆA, and therefore the interval J0 contains the initial primal interval
6.
Notice thatM(2)(vˆ) =M(2)(v) + s′0 ·v(2) because every optimal decreasing
pricing can sell to the first s0 bidders at price v
(2) without affecting the
pricing for the remaining bidders; this is because the prices for the remain-
ing bidders cannot exceed v(2). Similar constraints hold for M(2)(vˆA) and
M(2)(vˆB).
Let ALGM be the expected revenue when we apply the pricing scheme
to vA and vB and let ALGF be the expected revenue when we apply an
algorithm which is competitive against F (2). The expected revenue of the
algorithm is (ALGM + ALGF )/2. The revenue extracted from the part
against F (2) will play a crucial role in relating the revenue of the original
sequence with the revenue with the padded sequence. For the padded se-
quence, let ˆALGM be the corresponding expected revenue for the padded
sequence, that is, when we apply the pricing scheme to vAˆ and vBˆ. From
the previous subsection, we have that
ˆALGM ≥ c1 ·
(
M(2)(v) + s′0 · v(2)
)
,
for some constant c1. Also, it is easy to see that the prices of the algorithm
applied to vˆ match the prices of the algorithm applied to v, so we have that
ˆALGM ≤ ALGM + s′0 · v(2). Putting the last two inequalities together, we
get
ALGM ≥ c1 ·
(
M(2)(v) + s′0 · v(2)
)
− s′0 · v(2)
= c1 · M(2)(v)− (1− c1) · s′0 · v(2).
The second term is the reason for targeting both F (2) andM(2) and explains
the need to run a competitive algorithm against F (2) with probability 1/2.
6We need to select s′0 large enough so that this probability is greater than 1− 1/32 to
guarantee that all assumptions and events of the previous subsection hold with posititive
probability.
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To account for the second term, we observe that with probability 1/2,
the algorithm gets revenue at least c′1 ·F (2)(v) ≥ c′1 ·2v(2), for some constant
c′1. That is,
ALGF ≥ c′1 · 2v(2).
Combining the two bounds for ALG, we get
ALG ≥ 1
2
ALGM
ALG ≥ 1
2
ALGF
ALG ≥ (1− c1) · s
′
0 ·
(
1
2ALGF
)
+ 2c′1 ·
(
1
2ALGM
)
(1− c1) · s′0 + 2c′1
=
c1 · c′1
(1− c1) · s′0 + 2c′1
· M(2)(v),
which shows that the algorithm has constant approximation ratio.
4 Multi-Unit Auctions
In this section we extend our results to multi-unit auctions with limited
supply. To develop this theory, we extend the monotone price benchmark
M(2) to the case of an arbitrary number k ≥ 2 of units for sale. We call a
price vector p feasible for the valuation profile v and supply limit k if: (i)
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn; (ii) all prices are at most the second-highest valuation
of v; and (iii) there are at most k bidders i with vi > pi. We allow our
benchmark to break ties in an optimal way. More precisely, the revenue
earned by a feasible price vector is
∑
i : vi>pi
pi plus, if there are ` items
remaining, the sum of the prices offered to up to ` bidders i with vi = pi.
We define the k-unit monotone price benchmarkM(2,k)(v) as the maximum
revenue obtained by a price vector that is feasible for v and k.
There are two main issues to address. The first issue is to identify
a class of priors Fi such that M(2,k)(v) is a meaningful benchmark for
prior-free approximation, i.e., it simultaneously approximates all optimal
auctions in multi-unit Bayesian settings with priors drawn from the class.
The challenge, relative to the unlimited-supply setting introduced in [17],
is that limited-supply Bayesian optimal auctions exhibit more complex be-
havior than unlimited-supply ones. Section 4.1 shows, essentially, that the
benchmarkM(2,k)(v) is meaningful for any valuation distributions that have
pointwise ordered ironed virtual valuations The second issue is to design
auctions competitive with the benchmark M(2,k)(v). We accomplish this
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through a general reduction, showing how to build a limited-supply auction
that is O(1)-competitive w.r.t. M(2,k)(v) from a digital goods auction that
is O(1)-competitive w.r.t. M(2).
4.1 Justifying the k-Unit Monotone Price Benchmark
The goal of this section is to prove that every prior-free auction that is O(1)-
competitive with the benchmark M(2,k)(v) has expected revenue at least
a constant fraction of optimal in every Bayesian multi-unit environment
with valuation distributions lying in a prescribed class. Making this precise
requires some terminology and facts from the theory of Bayesian optimal
auction design, as developed by Myerson [19]. See also the exposition by
Hartline [11].
Consider a bidder with valuation drawn from a prior distribution F with
positive and continuous density f on some interval. The virtual value v at
a point v in the support is defined as
φ(v) = v − 1−F(v)
f(v)
.
For example, if F is the uniform distribution on [0, a], then the corresponding
virtual valuation function is φ(v) = 2v − a.
For clarity, we first discuss the case of regular distributions, meaning
distributions with nondecreasing virtual valuation functions. In this case,
the Bayesian optimal auction awards items to the (at most k) bidders with
the highest positive virtual valuations. The payment of a winning bidder is
the minimum bid at which it would continue to win (keeping others’ bids
the same). That is, if the (k+ 1)th highest virtual valuation is z, then every
winning bidder i pays φ−1i (max{0, z}). For these prices to be related to the
monotone price benchmark, we need to impose conditions on the φ−1i (z)’s.
This contrasts with unlimited-supply settings, where restricting the φ−1i (0)’s
— that is, the monopoly reserve prices — to be nonincreasing in i is enough
to justify the monotone-price benchmark [17]. Since the (k + 1)th highest
virtual valuation could be anything, the natural extension of the condition
in [17] is to restrict φ−1i (z) to be nonincreasing in i for every non-negative
number z.
Accommodating irregular distributions, for which the optimal Bayesian
auction is more complicated, presents additional complications. Each virtual
valuation function φi is replaced by the “nearest nondecreasing approxima-
tion”, called the ironed virtual valuation function φ¯i. The optimal auction
awards the items to the (at most k) bidders with the highest positive ironed
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virtual valuations. Since ironed virtual valuation functions typically have
non-trivial constant regions, ties can occur, and we assume that ties are
broken randomly. That is, if there are k items, a group S of bidders with
identical ironed virtual values z > 0, ` < k bidders with ironed virtual value
greater than z, and ` + |S| > k, then k − ` winners from S are chosen
uniformly at random.
We call valuation distributions F1, . . . ,Fn pointwise ordered if φ¯−1i (z) is
nonincreasing in i for every non-negative z.7 The motivating parametric
examples discussed earlier — uniform distributions with intervals [0, hi] and
nonincreasing hi’s, exponential distributions with nondecreasing rates, and
Gaussian distributions with nonincreasing means — are pointwise ordered
in this sense.
We also require a second condition, which we inherit from the standard
i.i.d. unlimited-supply setting. The issue is that, with arbitrary irregular dis-
tributions, no prior-free auction can be simultaneously near-optimal in all
Bayesian environments, even with i.i.d. bidders and unlimited supply.8 Var-
ious mild conditions are sufficient to rule out this problem; see [13] for a dis-
cussion. Here, for simplicity, we restrict attention to well-behaved Bayesian
multi-unit environments, meaning that the Bayesian optimal auction de-
rives at most a constant fraction (90%, say) of its revenue from outcomes
in which some winner is charged a price higher than the second-highest
valuation. (Such a winner is necessarily the bidder with the highest valua-
tion.) Standard distributions always yield well-behaved environments. Even
pathological distributions produce well-behaved environments provided the
market is sufficiently large (e.g., there are enough bidders drawn i.i.d. from
each of the distributions).
Our main result in this section is that approximating the k-unit mono-
tone price benchmark guarantees simultaneous approximation of the optimal
auction in all well-behaved Bayesian multi-unit environments with pointwise
ordered distributions.
Theorem 4.1 If the expected revenue of the multi-unit auction A is at least
a constant fraction of M(2,k)(v) on every input, then, in every well-behaved
7Since φ¯i is continuous and nondecreasing, φ¯
−1
i (z) is an interval. If the inverse image
has multiple points, we define φ¯−1i (z) by the infimum. If the inverse image is empty, we
define φ¯−1i (z) as the left or right endpoint of the distribution’s support, as appropriate.
8Informally, consider valuation distributions that take on only two values, one very
large (say M) and the other 0. Suppose the probability of having a very large valuation
is very small (say 1/n2). If the distribution is known, the optimal auction uses a reserve
price of M for each bidder. Elementary arguments, as in [13], show that no single auction
is near-optimal for all values of M .
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multi-unit Bayesian environment with pointwise ordered distributions, the
expected revenue of A is at least a constant fraction of that of the optimal
auction for the environment.
Proof: Fix an auction that is β-competitive with M(2,k)(v) on every input.
Fix a well-behaved Bayesian multi-unit environment with pointwise ordered
valuation distributions F1, . . . ,Fn. Let A∗ be the optimal auction for this
environment. We claim that, for every input v in which the revenue collected
by A∗ from the bidder with the highest valuation is at most the second-
highest valuation, the benchmark M(2,k)(v) is at least half the expected
revenue of A∗ on v. This implies that the expected revenue of A is at
least 1/2β times that of A∗ on this input. Since the environment is well
behaved, the theorem follows.
To prove the claim, fix an input v, as above. Recall that A∗, as a
Bayesian optimal auction, awards items to the (at most k) bidders with
the highest positive ironed virtual valuations, breaking ties randomly. The
tricky case of the proof is when ties occur. Assume there are k items, a
group S of bidders with common ironed virtual value z > 0, and a group T
of ` ∈ (k − |S|, k) bidders with ironed virtual value greater than ` (so
|S| > k − `). We next explicitly compute the payments collected by A∗
on this input, using the standard payment formula for incentive-compatible
mechanisms (see [19] or [11]). Let ai and bi denote the left and right end-
points, respectively, of the interval of values v that satisfy φ¯i(v) = z. Since
the distributions are pointwise ordered, the ai’s and the bi’s are nonincreas-
ing in i. Let q = (k− `)/|S| denote the winning probability of a bidder in S.
Define q′ = (k− `+ 1)/(|S|+ 1) as the hypothetical winning probability of a
bidder in T if it lowered its bid to the value φ¯−1i (z). The expected payment
of a bidder i in S is qai (i.e., ai in the event that it wins). The expected
payment of a bidder i in T (who wins with certainty) is q′ai + (1 − q′)bi.
To complete the proof, we argue that M(2,k)(v) is at least the expected
revenue collected by A∗ from the bidders in S, and also at least that from
the bidders in T .
Projecting onto a subset of bidders only decreases the value of the k-
unit monotone price benchmark M(2,k)(v) (see Lemma A.1 for the formal
argument). First, project onto the k bidders of S with the highest ai values.
Consider charging each such bidder the price ai. This is a monotone price
vector. By our assumption on the input v, all of these prices are at most the
second-highest valuation in v. By the definitions, vi ≥ ai for every bidder
i ∈ S so every offer will be accepted. The resulting revenue is at least the
expected revenue earned by A∗ on v, and the value of the monotone price
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benchmark can only be higher. This shows that M(2,k)(v) is at least the
expected revenue collected by A∗ from bidders in S.
Similarly, project onto the (at most k) bidders of T , and consider charg-
ing each such bidder i the price q′ai + (1− q′)bi. Again, this is a monotone
price vector with all prices bounded above by the second-highest valuation
of v, and every offer will be accepted. The value of the monotone price
benchmark can only be larger, so M(2,k)(v) is also at least the expected
revenue collected by A∗ from bidders in T . The proof is complete. 
4.2 Reduction from Limited to Unlimited Supply
Having justified the k-unit monotone price benchmark M(2,k)(v), we turn
to designing auctions that approximate it well. We show that competing
with this benchmark reduces to competing with the benchmark M(2) in
unlimited-supply settings. This reduction from limited to unlimited sup-
ply is a generalization of one for identical bidders [9]. The idea is to first
identify the k “most valuable” bidders, and then run an unlimited-supply
auction on them. In contrast to the identical-bidder setting in [9], the most
valuable bidders with an ordering are not necessarily those with the highest
valuations. For example, a high-valuation bidder late in the ordering need
not be valuable, because extracting high revenue from it might necessitate
excluding many moderate-valuation bidders earlier in the ordering.
We analyze the “black-box reduction” shown in Figure 6.
Input: A valuation profile v for a totally ordered set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of
bidders and k identical items. A truthful digital goods (unlimited supply)
auction A for ordered bidders.
1. Let p∗ achieve the optimum monotone price benchmarkM(2,k)(v) for v
and k. Let S = {i ∈ N : vi ≥ p∗i } be the set of winners under p∗.
2. Run the unlimited supply auctionA on the bidders S, with the induced
bidder ordering.
3. Charge suitable prices so that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy
for every bidder.
Figure 6: The auction Black-Box Reduction (BBR).
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Theorem 4.2 If A is a truthful unlimited-supply auction with ordered bid-
ders that is β-competitive with M(2), then the Black-Box Reduction
(BBR) auction is a truthful limited-supply auction with ordered bidders that
is 2β-competitive with M(2,k)(v).
Proof: The Black-Box Reduction (BBR) auction is clearly feasible, in
that there are always at most k winners. The first step can be implemented
efficiently using dynamic programming, so if A runs in polynomial time,
then so does the Black-Box Reduction (BBR) auction. To see that it is
truthful, first note that the allocation rule in the first step is monotone — if
bidder i belongs to the computed set S in the profile v, then it also belongs
to S for every bigger valuation vi (holding other bidders’ valuations fixed).
The composition of this rule with the truthful auction in the second step is
also monotone (i.e., bidding higher only increases winning probability), so
there are unique payments that render the auction truthful (see e.g. [11]).
These payments are easy to describe. Monotonicity of the first step implies
that each bidder i faces a threshold bid ti(v−i) that is necessary and sufficient
to be included in the computed set S. The payment of a winner i in the
final step of the Black-Box Reduction (BBR) auction is simply ti(v−i)
or the payment computed by A, whichever is larger.
We prove the performance guarantee by arguing the following two state-
ments: (i) the unlimited supply benchmark M(2) applied to S is at least
half of the limited-supply benchmark M(2,k)(v) applied to the original bid-
der set; and (ii) the revenue of Black-Box Reduction (BBR) on the
original bidder set is at least that of the unlimited-supply auction A with
the bidders S. The second statement follows immediately from the facts that
the winners of Black-Box Reduction (BBR) are the same as those of A,
and that the winners’ payments are only higher. For statement (i), consider
prices p∗ that determine the benchmarkM(2,k)(v). The projection p∗S of this
price vector onto the set S of bidders has revenue exactlyM(2,k)(v). If p∗S is
feasible, then it certifies that the benchmarkM(2) is at leastM(2,k)(v). The
only issue is if the second-highest bidder is excluded from S, in which case p∗S
might use a price larger than the second-highest valuation in S (which is not
permitted by the benchmark M(2)). But such a price can only extract rev-
enue from the bidder with the highest valuation, and every price of p∗ is at
most the second-highest valuation v(2) of the original bidders. Thus, we can
restore feasibility to p∗S by lowering at most one price to the second-highest
valuation of S, and we lose revenue at most v(2). SinceM(2,k)(v) ≥ 2v(2) —
consider the price vector that offers v(2) to everybody — we retain at least
half the revenue of p∗S . Statement (i) and the theorem follow. 
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Of course, we can use the Optimal Price Scaling (OPS) auction from
Section 3 in Theorem 4.2 to obtain a truthful limited-supply auction that
is O(1)-competitive with the benchmark M(2,k)(v). Theorem 4.1 implies
that the resulting auction also enjoys a strong simultaneous approximation
guarantee in Bayesian environments.
References
[1] G. Aggarwal and J. D. Hartline. Knapsack auctions. In Proceedings
of the 17th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(SODA), pages 1083–1092, 2006.
[2] S. Alaei, A. Malekian, and A. Srinivasan. On random sampling auc-
tions for digital goods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 187–196, 2009.
[3] P. Azar, C. Daskalakis, S. Micali, and S. M. Weinberg. Optimal and
efficient parametric auctions. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual ACM-
SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2013.
[4] J. Chen and S. Micali. Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs. In
Proceedings of the 52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), pages 87–96, 2011.
[5] N. Devanur and J. D. Hartline. Limited and online supply and the
Bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. In Proceedings of
the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 41–50,
2009.
[6] N. Devanur, J. D. Hartline, A. R. Karlin, and T. Nguyen. A prior-
independent mechanism for profit maximization in unit-demand com-
binatorial auctions. In Proceedings of 7th Workshop on Internet &
Network Economics, 2011. To appear.
[7] Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, and Qiqi Yan. Revenue
maximization with a single sample. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 129–138, 2010.
[8] A. Goldberg and J. Hartline. Envy-free auctions for digital goods. In
Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC),
pages 29–35, 2003.
26
[9] A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks, and A. Wright.
Competitive auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):242–269,
2006.
[10] A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions
and digital goods. Technical Report STAR-TR-99.09.01, STAR Labo-
ratory, InterTrust Tech. Corp., Santa Clara, CA, 1999.
[11] J. D. Hartline. Approximation in economic design. Book in preparation,
2012.
[12] J. D. Hartline and A. Karlin. Profit maximization in mechanism design.
In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E´. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, editors,
Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 13, pages 331–362. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
[13] J. D. Hartline and T. Roughgarden. Optimal mechanism design and
money burning. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 75–84, 2008. Full version last
revised August, 2012.
[14] J. D. Hartline and T. Roughgarden. Simple versus optimal mechanisms.
In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(EC), pages 225–234, 2009.
[15] J. D. Hartline and Q. Yan. Envy, truth, and optimality. In Proceedings
of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 243–
252, 2011.
[16] T. Ichiba and K. Iwama. Averaging techniques for competitive auc-
tions. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Analytic Algorithmics and
Combinatorics (ANALCO), pages 74–81, 2010.
[17] S. Leonardi and T. Roughgarden. Prior-free auctions with ordered bid-
ders. In Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC), pages 427–434, 2012.
[18] G. Lopomo, L. Rigotti, and C. Shannon. Uncertainty in mechanism
design. Submitted, 2009.
[19] R. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
27
[20] N. Nisan. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists).
In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E´. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algo-
rithmic Game Theory, chapter 9, pages 209–241. Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
[21] Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and Qiqi Yan. Supply-limiting
mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce (EC), pages 844–861, 2012.
A Missing Proofs
Lemma A.1 For every valuation profile v, k ≥ 2, and subset S of the
bidders with induced profile vS, M(2,k)(v) ≥M(2)(k,vS).
Proof: (Sketch.) Fix an input v, with monotone prices p∗ determiningM(2,k)(v).
By induction, we only need to show that adding a single new bidder i can
only increase the value of the benchmark. Start by offering i the same price q
as its predecessor in the ordering (or the second-highest valuation, if there
is no predecessor). If i rejects (i.e., vi < q), this extended price vector is
feasible and we are done (the optimal feasible price vector is only better).
If i accepts (i.e., vi ≥ q) then the price vector is infeasible (with k + 1 win-
ners) and we argue as follows. Go through the bidders after i one by one,
increasing the offer price to q. This preserves monotonicity. If a previously
winning bidder ever rejects this higher offer price, we are done (feasibility
is restored and the overall revenue is higher). If not, there is now a “suffix”
of bidders with the common offer price q. (This case only occurs if i is after
all of the winners in p∗.) We now increase their common offer price until it
equals that of the previous bidder, thereby increasing the number of bidders
in the suffix. Eventually a bidder that was winning under p∗ will reject the
new offer price (otherwise it would contradict the optimality of p∗), leaving
us with a feasible monotone price vector with revenue at least that of the
original one. 
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